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I. INTRODUCTION
Danny is a good-natured child. Nobody knew there was anything
wrong with 'him until he went to school. He had a little trouble learning
to read, and that embarrassed him. He was tested ky the school psycholo-
gist, who told his parents that he was "mildly retarded," but they didn't
understand what that meant. He was put in the "basic" class, and everyone
knew what that meant; the other kids called him "reetard" on the play-
ground. He fell far behind; he sought attention by clowning in class.
He was told that if he continued misbehaving he would be sent home,
which gave him little incentive to "behave" since he was unhappy at school
anyway. He was sent home periodically, and the periods grew longer
and longer. He is now 13 years old and has not been to school regularly
for three years. The school authorities now say he needs to go to a special
school, but there is a long waiting list. So Danny waits.
This is a recurring scene in every major city in the country thousands
of times each year. The curious thing is that we as a society are only
beginning to be aware of the Dannys who drift in and out of our public
school system. Until recently, almost no one paid any attention to Danny,
much less to the question of his rights in this kind of situation.1
Parents and professionals are now challenging both the educational
and the legal system to recognize that the vast numbers of mentally retarded
children in this country have legally enforceable rights. One of the most
important of these is the right to education. The educational process has
traditionally been seen as a fundamental tool for the vindication of the
rights of minority groups. Yet, ironically, the persons who need education
most because of their special disability, have been systematically denied
this tool largely because they have been judged unable to wield it. This
comment will analyze the right of mentally retarded children to equal
educational opportunity. The analysis begins by examining the nature of
mental retardation and the present status of retarded children in relation
to the educational system. The discussion will then analyze the nature
1 In fact, when provision is made for the educational needs of "exceptional children,"
all too often it is thought of, as one newspaper put it, as an "education gift." In describing
a proposed bill in the state legislature which would require school districts to provide education
to all children regardless of handicap, the report uses the gift metaphor throughout. The
legislators are writing a "gift list," and the "packaging" is House Bill 2256. The state is
contemplating giving to exceptional children-deaf, blind, cerebral palsied, learning disabled,
mentally retarded-a gift of education, something which "normal" children take for granted
as their due. G. Hutton, House bill may give education gift for exceptional children, The
Arizona Republic, March 9, 1973 at -45, col. 2.
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of the right to education and explore the contours of this right as it applies
to the mentally retarded. Finally, special emphasis will be placed on the
right to integration into regular classrooms of the "educable mentally re-
tarded" (EMR), who, if they are being educated at all, are currently being
placed in special classes in the public schools.
II. EDUCATION AND THE MENTALLY RETARDED
A. Who Are the Mentally Retarded?
"He that begetteth a fool, doeth it to his sorrow." Proverbs
When a person is considered mentally retarded, the sorrow is not solely
in his handicap of retardation but more significantly in the treatment, or
even nontreatment, accorded him by the "normal" world. The parents
of a retarded child are pitied; their child is viewed as an anchor around
their necks, and a drain on society's resources, useless both to himself and
to the world around him. Society's sincere pity for, and neglect of, these
children is mirrored in the public school system, which, while expressing
concern, altogether excludes large numbers of these children.
This neglect which often results in exclusion from the educational pro-
cess or even institutionalization is based in large part on the misconception
that retarded individuals make up a large, homogeneous group of persons
who are incapable of learning even to care for themselves, much less to
cope with the world or to pursue a useful occupation. Thus, it is thought,
this group is easily set apart from the "normal" population; a person is
either retarded or not, and the difference is a measurable one. Such miscon-
ceptions ignore the very real problems involved in defining what is meant
by mental retardation and in distinguishing among the various levels or
ranges ot retardation. Although there is some confusion and overlap in
the terms used, educational experts agree on the importance of distinguish-
ing among the degrees of impairment represented by these levels.
Degrees of mental retardation are measured by considering both "mea-
sured intelligence" and "impairment in adaptive behavior." For descrip-
tive convenience the range of mental retardation has been divided into
four levels-mild, moderate, severe, and profound. Children who are
classified as mildly retarded (frequently called "educable mentally re-
tarded" by educators), although limited in their potentials for advanced
academic achievement, can usually be brought by special educational tech-
niques to a state of self-sufficiency as adults. Moderately retarded chil-
dren show a rate of mental development which is less than half of that
normally expected, but can nevertheless learn to take care of their per-
sonal needs and perform many useful tasks in the home or in a sheltered
working situation. The severely retarded can learn self-care, but their po-
tential economic productivity is limited.
The profoundly retarded also respond to training in basic self-care,
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and they additionally profit from special training in such areas as behavior
control, self-protection, language development, and physical mobility 2
Thus, although the mentally retarded as a class share many characteris-
tics, each level presents its own special problems and needs, and each de-
mands some specific response by society. This response is not forthcom-
ing when a society not only fails to discern the differences in learning
capabilities, but also judges the whole class by those who have the most
severe impairment and the least potential for development. Society's per-
ceptions of some 7,000,000 persons are thus based on the characteristics of
a subclass of only 92,000 persons, the profoundly retarded. The following
figures, based on 1970 data, are important for this discussion only to show
the relative size of each subgroup.
ESTIMATES OF RETARDATION BY AGE AND DEGREE-19703
Under
1970 Census All Ages 21 Yrs.
General Population 203.2 million 80.5 million
3% General Population 6.1 million 2.4 million
Retarded
Profound (IQ 0-20) 92 thousand 36 thousand
About 112%
Severe (IQ 20-35) 214 thousand 84 thousand
About 3 %
Moderate (IQ 36-52) 366 thousand 144 thousand
About 6%
Mild (IQ 53+) 5.4 million-- 2.1 million+
About 89%
The factor of crucial importance in this data is that the mildly retarded,
often called "educable mentally retarded," comprise the great bulk
of the entire retarded class-2.1 million persons out of a total of 2.4 mil-
lion under 21 years of age. The next largest group is the moderately re-
tarded, sometimes called "trainable," consisting of only 144,000 persons un-
der 21 years of age. Thus, it must be remembered in the following dis-
cussion that a mentally retarded child is very much more likely to fall into
the EMR class than into any other.
B. Denial of Education to the Mentally Retarded
Today approximately 60% of mentally retarded children receive no
education at all.4 Assuming that none of the states is simply indifferent to
2 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CHILDREN, FACTS ON M1ENTAL RETARDATION
4 (1971).
3 Id. at 15.
4 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MR 69: TowARD PROGRESS:
THE STORY OF A DECADE, 18 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MR 69].
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the fate of these children, the explanation for their exclusion probably re-
lates to claims that 1) they cannot benefit from education, and 2) it is too
expensive to educate them.
1. Can the mentally retarded benefit from education?
All states provide, usually in their constitutions, for free public educa-
tion to all children of specified ages; all states make school attendance
compulsory.5 But most states exempt from compulsory attendance those
who cannot benefit from education.6 For example, until recently Pennsyl-
vania provided that the State Board of Education had no obligation to
educate a child certified as uneducable and untrainable by a school psycholo-
gist.7 Further, compulsory school attendance was waived for a child found
unable to profit therefrom (it appears that in practice, Pennsylvania used
this statute to exclude mentally retarded children from its schools).8 Simi-
larly, the District of Columbia's legal obligation was only to provide a
publicly supported education to each resident of the District capable of
benefiting from such instruction.9 The federal courts which examined
these situations found that such laws were being used to justify excluding
mentally retarded children from public schools on the grounds that they
could not benefit from education.10
The attitude that the mentally retarded cannot benefit from education
is reflected in the laws of most states. As one writer puts it, "historically,
mental retardation and other developmental disabilities . . . have been
taken de facto, as sufficient cause for the denial of educational rights.""
This attitude is based on the ancient assumption that certain people simply
cannot learn.
Modern educators reject this dogma. These "pessimistic views, which
have been so widely, and for so long, entertained regarding the ineduca-
bility of the mental defective, are unwarranted."'12 The Council for Ex-
ceptional Children takes the position that all mentally retarded children are
educable and must be provided for in the public school system: "There is
no dividing line which excludes some children and includes others in edu-
5 THE COUNCIL FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, DIGEST OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAws:
EDUCATION OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN (1971).
6id.
7 Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. CommonwedIth of Pennsylvania, 343
F. Supp. 279, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1972) [hereinafter cited as PARC]. See also 24 PURD. STAT.
Sec. 13-1375 (1965).
a PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 282.
9 Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866, 874 (D.D.C.
1972).
10 PARC, 343 F. Supp. 279; Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866.
11 Goldberg, Human Rights for the Mentally Retarded in the School System, 9 MENTAL
RETARDATION 3, 5 (1971).
12 R. YATES, BEHAVIOR THERAPY 324 (1970).
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cational programs. Mentally retarded children of yesteryear who were ex-
cluded because they were "unteachable" have recently become 'educable'
or 'trainable'."' 3  The National Association for Retarded Children also
stresses this idea:
Public School Education must be provided for all mentally retarded per-
sons, including the severely and profoundly retarded. There should be no
dividing line which excludes children from public education services. If
current educative technologies and facilities are inappropriate for the edu-
cation of some retarded persons, then these existing educational regimes
should be modified.14
A federal court in Pennsylvania became the first court in the country
to accept this idea of the educability of all mentally retarded. 5 The
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children brought a class action suit
to challenge the state's practice of excluding mentally retarded children
from its schools on the grounds they were unable to benefit from educa-
tion. The plaintiffs presented convincing evidence, which was accepted by
the court, that all children can benefit from education. The state, pre-
sumably, in an effort to preserve the constitutionality of its education laws,
agreed to reinterpret its statutes so as to prevent their being used to ex-
clude mentally retarded children. Thus it entered into a consent agree-
ment with the plaintiffs in which the state agreed to provide "to every per-
son between the ages of six and twenty-one ... access to a free public
program of education and training appropriate to his learning capaci-
ties."' 6  The consent agreement, significantly incorporating the following
summary of expert opinion, concludes that
all mentally retarded persons are capable of benefitting from a program
of education and training; that the greatest number of retarded persons,
given such education and training, are capable of achieving self-suffi-
ciency and the remaining few, with such education and training are ca-
pable of achieving some degree of self-care; that the earlier such education
and training begins, the more thoroughly and the more efficiently a mental-
ly retarded person will benefit from it and, whether begun early or not,
that a mentally retarded person can benefit at any point in his life and
development from a program of education.' 7
In a similar suit brought in the District of Columbia, the federal district
court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, declaring that no child
of an age making him eligible for public education shall be excluded unless
1a 37 J. EXCEPTIONAL CmLDREN 422, 429 (1971).
14 National Association for Retarded Children, Policy Statement on the Education of Mentally
Retarded Children, adopted April, 1971, at 2.
'5 PARC, 343 F. Supp. 279.
16Id. at 302.
17 Id. at 296 (footnotes omitted).
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he is provided "adequate alternative educational services suited to the child's
needs, which may include special education or tuition grants."18
Thus, courts are beginning to recognize that all individuals can benefit
from education and that state laws which exclude some children on the
basis of "ineducability" are cruelly anachronistic.
2. Is it too expensive to educate the mentally retarded?
Although expert opinion holds that all children can benefit from educa-
ion, it is unarguable that it would be more expensive per child for the
state to provide education for the mentally retarded child than for the
"normal" child. Special training for the teacher, small pupil-teacher ratios
allowing for more individual attention, and an adjusted tempo of "prog-
ress" expectations are all required. In addition, some mentally retarded
children are multi-handicapped, thus necessitating medical facilities and
personnel, and an even higher degree of teacher specialization.
Two important facets of the cost problem must be considered. First,
is it in fact more expensive to educate mentally retarded children than
not to do so, and second, if it is more expensive, is that sufficient justifi-
cation for denying education to the mentally retarded?
As to the first question, while it is clear that the retarded are indivi-
vidually more expensive to educate than the non-retarded, it has been per-
suasively argued that it will ultimately cost the state a great deal more
not to educate these children. In 1967, this country spent $500-600 mil-
lion for institutionalizing about 200,000 people (half of whom were chil-
dren) in public institutions for the mentally retarded. 9 In addition, there
are private institutions (with 20,000 mentally retarded residents) and insti-
tutions for the mentally ill (in which the mentally retarded comprise 10
percent of the residents). The number institutionalized increases by
3,000 every year.2 0 Finally, there are many thousands of mentally re-
tarded persons who are either economically dependent on the state for pub-
lic assistance or are dependent on private sources and are economically un-
productive in society. The President's Committee on Mental Retardation
estimates that with education and training three-quarters of all mentally
retarded people could be fully self-supporting; an additional 10-15%
percent could be partially self-supporting.2 Members of the President's
Committee writing in 1972 said:
The major point of difference in the levels of retardation is that while
the profoundly retarded may have to remain in institutions during their
18 Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. at 878.
19 CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 17
(R. Kugle & W. Wolfensberger, ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as CHANGING PATrERNS].
20d.
2 1MR 69 at 17.
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entire lives, the others are educable to a surprising degree. The moder-
ately retarded can be taught to take care of themselves physically and can
learn some manual skills. Though the moderately retarded cannot master
formal school work, the mildly retarded can reach the sixth grade and can
also learn to do and to hold simple jobs.22
A federal court in Alabama concluded last year that no "mildly re-
tarded" individual should be institutionalized at all.23 Yet of those residing
in institutions, 18 percent are mildly or borderline retarded. An additional
22 percent who are moderately retarded, could presumably become fully
or partially self-sufficient through education.24 Thus it is sdbmitted that,
with education, many of those presently institutionalized could not only be
released, but in large measure be self-supporting. Because those who are
institutionalized include the most severely retarded, presumably a far greater
percentage of those who reside outside of institutions are likely to be able
to achieve self-support.
A state which studied this problem in long-range economic terms should
find that taxpayers' money would be saved by immediate investment of
funds in the education and training of its mentally retarded citizens. Most
could become totally or partially self-supporting; even those who must
remain in institutions could attain a measure of self-care, which would
decrease the cost of institutionalization.25
One expert has estimated the saving a state might make by educating
one mentally retarded individual for twelve years (at an annual cost of
$1,000) instead of allowing him to become a ward of the state (50 years
at $2,000 per year).26 On the basis of these figures alone, the saving
would be $88,000 per person.17  Anything the individual earns after he
is educated may represent an even greater saving to the state in tax revenue.
This expert concluded: "This country can no longer afford to avoid its
responsibilities for educating the handicapped either in financial or moral
terms.''2s
Thus, evidence indicates that in purely economic terms it makes sense
for a state to educate the mentally retarded. However, states often over-
look such long-range economic benefits, focusing instead only on apparent
short-term costs. In light of this tendency, the important question is
whether, even if it were not possible to save money through the education
of its mentally retarded citizens, a state can justify denying them educa-
22 Haggerty, Kane, & Udall, An Essay on the Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded,
6 FAM. L. Q. 59, 65 (1972).
23 Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 396 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
24 CHANGING PATTERNS, supra note 19, at 20.
25This assumes that most of the staff at institutions is custodial. See, e.g., Murdock,
Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 48 NomRE DAME LAw. 133, 164 (1972).
26 1d. at 165 n.122.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 165.
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tion merely on a cost basis, once it is recognized that the mentally retarded
can benefit from education.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION
A legal analysis of the denial of education to the mentally retarded
must begin with the equal protection clause. Historically the Supreme
Court has employed one of two standards in determining whether a partic-
ular classification is a denial of equal protection. If a state has established
a classification that either affects a fundamental interest or creates a suspect
classification, the Court will apply the "strict scrutiny" test to the legisla-
tive classification in question.29 A heavy burden is then placed upon the
state to show that it has a compelling interest in maintaining the classifi-
cation.
If the special scrutiny test does not apply, the Court has traditionally
used a rational basis test to see whether the classification works an invidi-
ous discrimination on one class or another.30 A discrimination is invidious
if it is not reasonably related to a permissible legislative purpose.81 One
who attacks a legislative classification under the equal protection clause
then must "carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary."82
Given the Court's traditional deference to the legislative judgment, this
is an especially heavy burden. In speaking of this deference, former Chief
Justice Warren noted that it
permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which
affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional
safeguard is offended only if the dassification rests on grounds wholly ir-
relevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are
presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory dis-
crimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.m
A survey of recent opinions demonstrates that the Court has been
willing to use a more elastic equal protection analysis than the black-white
dichotomy used by the Warren Court. 4  Shades of gray emerge as the
Court appears to look more closely at the reasonableness of the challenged
29 See, e.g., interstate travel: Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); voting: Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 387 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
procreation: Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
0 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
31Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
32 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 79 (1911).
33McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
34 Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine-
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 12
(1972).
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legislative classification. For example, seven decisions handed down in
1972 sustained an equal protection claim without the need for strict scru-
tiny. 5 In other words, in each of these cases, the state's claim of a rational
basis for its legislation was rejected, and the Court indicated that it would
inquire into the rationality of the means employed by the legislature to
achieve its stated purpose. Professor Gerald Gunther has called this a
means-focused equal protection test,36 saying that "the yardstick for the
acceptability of the means would be the purposes chosen by the legislatures,
not 'constitutional' interest drawn from the value perceptions of the Jus-
tices."37
Four of the equal protection decisions were unanimous. Mr. Justice
Blackmun, in Jackson v. Indiana,8 found that Indiana's procedure for com-
mitting criminal defendants who are declared incompetent to stand trial
made commitment easier and release more difficult than procedures govern-
ing civil commitment. The Court held this discrimination to be a violation
of the equal protection clause. Although the Court once alludes to the
"substantial rights" which the criminal defendant is denied, it never men-
tions constitutionally fundamental rights, suspect classification, or strict
scrutiny. Likewise, in Humphrey v. Cady,9 James v. Strange,40 and Reed
v. Reed,4 Justices Marshall, Powell, and Burger, respectively, make no
mention of special scrutiny, but in each case the legislative classification
is struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. In Reed, the
Court analyzed a sex-based classification which gave mandatory preference
to men in the administration of decedent's estates. Mr. Chief Justice Burger
noted that Idaho's stated purpose of reducing the probate courts' workload
by eliminating the need for a hearing in one class of contests "is not
without some legitimacy." 42  If the Court were using the traditional equal
protection test, the inquiry would no doubt have stopped there, and the
classification would have been allowed. But the Court found "crucial"
the question whether the statute advances the stated objective "in a manner
consistent with the command of the Equal Protection Clause. ' 48 In striking
35 James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The constitutional challenge was rejected in
only four equal protection cases: Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 54 (1972); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971); Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U.S. 78 (1971). See generally Gunther, id. at 12-37.
36 Gunther, supra note 34, at 28.
37Id. at 21.
38406 U.S. 715 (1972).
39 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
40 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
41404 U.S. 71 (1971).




down the statute, the Court said: "To give a mandatory preference to mem-
bers of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the
elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary
legislative choice forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment."4 4  There is
no mention in Reed of fundamental interests or suspect classes.45
The same approach is utilized in Eisenstadt v. Baird.46 Mr. Justice
Brennan relied on Reed, and explicitly eschewed any need for special scru-
tiny: "Just as in Reed v. Reed..., we do not have to address the statute's
validity under that test because the law fails to satisfy even the more lenient
equal protection standard. ' 47
Mr. Justice Powell also avoided making a choice between polar ex-
tremes in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.48 In invalidating a statu-
tory classification which gave a preference to legitimate over illegitimate
children for their father's workmen's compensation benefits, the Court again
analyzed the state's purposes. It did not question the importance of the
state's interest in protecting legitimate family relationships and in mini-
mizing problems of proof of dependency. But it did question whether
the means employed in the statute in fact served those ends. It held that
the means violated the fourteenth amendment rights of illegitimate chil-
dren, and that "the classification is justified by no legitimate state interest,
compelling or otherwise. 4
The Court has recently handed down another sex discrimination case,
Frontiero v. Richardson,' in which the classification was held unconstitu-
tional. Although four members of the Court5" in the plurality opinion
declared that sex is a suspect classification deserving of special scrutiny,
the other five52 explicitly refused to take that step. It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that eight of the nine Justices voted to strike down the statute, four
under a special scrutiny test, and four under a rational basis test. Those
Justices who would apply the rational basis test merely cite Reed, saying
it is unnecessary to add sex to the "narrowly limited group of classifications
which are inherently suspect."53
Thus, in none of these cases is strict scrutiny applied; yet, the scrutiny
is more careful than in the traditional equal protection analysis. 'What
44 Id.
45 However, Gunther, supra note 34, at 34, suggests that the Court is displaying a "special
sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor," see discussion of Frontiero v. Richardson, in!ra, text ac-
companying notes 50-53.
46405 U.S. 438 (1972).
47 Id. at 447, n.7.
48406 U.S. 164 (1972).
491d. at 176.
50 41 U.S.L.W. 4609 (U.S. May 14, 1973).
51justices Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall.
52 Justices Stewart, Powell, Burger, and Blackmun. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
53 41 U.S.LW. at 4614.
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may be developing is either a modified test of rationality, in which the
rationality will be examined rather than presumed, or the "spectrum of
standards" preferred by Mr. Justice Marshall. Gunther sees this emerging
theory as an "intensified" scrutiny of means which would "close the wide
gap between the strict scrutiny of the new equal protection and the mini-
mal scrutiny of the old not by abandoning the strict but by raising the
level of the minimal from virtual abdication to genuine judicial inquiry."54
A. Education As a Fundamental Interest-Rodriguez
Many state and lower federal courts have treated education as a funda-
mental interest requiring a strict scrutiny test. These courts have stressed
the importance of education both to the individual and to society, noting
its "unique impact on the mind, personality, and future role of the individ-
ual child;"55 it is "unmatched in the extent to which it molds the personal-
ity of the youth of society."516 Similarly, the public schools have been
termed by the Supreme Court "the most powerful agency for promoting
cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people,"57 and a "most vital
civil institution for the preservation of a democratic system of govern-
ment."5
8
However, despite such previous statements, the Supreme Court recently
considered the nature of the right to education, and apparently rejected
the developing theory. In San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,59 a class of poor Mexican-American children and their parents
challenged the Texas system of financing its public schools through prop-
erty taxes. The plaintiffs claimed that the system favored the affluent, and
thus denied to the poor the equal protection of the law. The plaintiffs'
claims were based on two theories either of which would have required
special scrutiny: 1) education is a fundamental right, and 2) wealth is
a suspect classification. The Court, although recognizing the importance
of education, refused to recognize it as a fundamental right in the consti-
tutional sense.
The Court's treatment of wealth as a suspect classification, on the other
hand, was equivocal. The Court found inapplicable the precedents which
suggested that a classification based on wealth was an invidious discrimina-
tion.60 In those cases, according to Mr. Justice Powell's analysis, the per-
54 Gunther, supra note 34, at 24.
55Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 875 (D. Minn. 1971).
56 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 609-10, 487 P.2d 1241, 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
619 (1971).
57 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216 (1948) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
58 Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
59 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973).
60 Buillock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams
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sons discriminated against were so poor that they could not pay for a
desired benefit, and as a result they "sustained an absolute deprivation of
a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit."6' In Rodriguez, the Court
found no clearly defined class of "the poor." Furthermore, it accepted
Texas' assertion that the state presently assures "every child in every school
district an adequate education. '6 -2 The Court suggested, however, that had
the plaintiffs been able to show that the two distinguishing characteristics
of wealth classifications, a definable class of indigents and a total depriva-
tion of the desired benefit, were present in Rodriguez, they "might arguably
[have met] the criteria established in these prior cases." 63  Mr. Justice
Powell thus strongly suggested that, were the plaintiffs receiving no public
education at all, they would have had a colorable equal protection claim. 4
Having rejected the bases for application of strict scrutiny, the Court
then moved to a traditional rational basis test. Under this test, the attack
on the state's classificatory scheme failed. The Court's analysis reflects
the two-tiered approach to equal protection utilized by the Warren Court
in the 1960's.65 It assumes that equal protection analysis can be made
to fit into "one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate stan-
dard of review-strict scrutiny or mere rationality." '6  Such a conception
implies two polarized standards, rather than a spectrum of standards for
equal protection analysis. Mr. Justice Marshall, perhaps the most articu-
late spokesman for a flexible equal protection test, dissenting in Rodriguez
refers to such a polarization as "an emasculation of the Equal Protection
Clause."67 The most comprehensive statement of his philosophy to date is
found in this dissent, in which he suggests that a principled reading of
recent Court opinions would reveal that the Court had applied a spectrum
of standards. According to Marshall,
v- Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
61 Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. at 1290.
62 Id. at 1292, citing appellant's brief at 35.
6ad. at 1291.
64 Id. at 1292, n.60:
An educational finance system might be hypothesized, however, in which the analogy
to the wealth discrimination cases would be considerably closer. If elementary and sec-
ondary education were made available by the State only to those able to pay a tuition
assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of "poor" people-
definable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed sum-who would be abso-
lutely precluded from receiving an education. That case would present a far more com-
pelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case before us today.
After all, Texas has undertaken to do a good deal more than provide an education
to those who can afford it. It has provided what it considers to be an adequate base
education for all children and has attempted, though imperfectly, to ameliorate by state
funding and by the local assessment program the disparities in local tax resources.
65 Gunther, supra note 34, at 12.
66 Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278, at 1330 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67 Id.
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[t~his spectrum dearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with
which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I be-
lieve, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adverse-
ly affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the
particular classification is drawn. I find in fact that many of the Court's
recent decisions embody the very sort of reasoned approach to equal pro-
tection analysis for which I previously argued-that is, an approach in
which "concentration [is] placed upon the character of the classification
in question, the relative importance to the individuals in the class discrimi-
nated against of the governmental benefits they do not receive, and the
asserted state interests in support of the classification.
68
On its face the Court's opinion in Rodriguez seems to revert to the
minimal scrutiny standard and thus to raise anew the problem inherent
in a rigid two-tiered equal protection analysis. However, the Rodriguez
holding might not be so much an abandonment of the "means-focused
equal protection test" as an exception to it. In speaking of the scope
of the means-focused approach Gunther notes that "the major limitation
on the exercise of that scrutiny would stem from particular consideration
of judicial competence, not from broad priori categorization of the "social
and economic" variety." 69  Such a limiting principle sets up what might
be called a competence parameter of judicial intervention-a point at which
the Court feels that "intractable economic, social, and even philosophical
problems" ° prevent it from being able to make any kind of principled
decision on the particular issues involved. Such questions then are best
left to the legislative not the judicial process.
The Court indicated that it viewed Rodriguez as something other than
one more in a long line of education cases. Had it seen the plaintiffs'
petition as simply asking for access to education on an equal basis, the
Court would certainly have concluded that it had the expertise to scrutinize
carefully the Texas educational system; for then the context of the issue
would have been a familiar one with which the Court, in a long line
of cases beginning with Brown, had frequently dealt. Rather the Court
felt the case concerned more complex questions. This can be seen in the
way Justice Powell framed the issue in the majority opinion:
This case represents far more than a challenge to the manner in which
Texas provides for the education of its children. We have here nothing
less than a direct attack on the way in which Texas has chosen to raise
and disburse state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn the
State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax
68Id., citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall J., dissent-
ing).
69 Gunther, supra note 34, at 23.
7 o Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 487.
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local property to supply revenues for local interests. In so doing, ap-
pellees would have the Court intrude in an area in which it has tradition-
ally deferred to state legislatures.71
It has deferred in the past, said the Court, and should continue to do
so because "the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the famil-
iarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions
with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues. 72
There are two other reasons why the Court saw Rodriguez to be es-
pecially appropriate for a limited form of review. The first, a necessary
corollary to its deferential stance towards a state's programs of taxation
and fiscal policies, concerns the implications of federalism. In speaking
about the problem of federalism Justice Powell stated that "it would be
difficult to imagifie a case having a greater potential impact on our federal
system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate
systems of financing public education presently in existence in virtually
every State. '73 Thus not only was Texas' system of financing being scruti-
nized but also the systems of almost all the other states.7 4  Further, too
rigorous a standard of scrutiny would perhaps allow all local fiscal schemes
to be called into question, not just those relating to education.
Finally, in addition to these questions of fiscal policy and federalism,
Rodriguez involved difficult issues of educational policy, especially
the unsettled and controversial question whether there is any correlation
between educational expenditures and educational quality. Because the
theory that the quality of education varies directly with the amount of
funds spent for it is a matter of considerable dispute among educators
and because the Court believed that the correlation-or lack of it-between
these two factors was the basis underlying virtually every legal issue, the
Court was especially unwilling to impose on the states any constitutional
restraints in this area. Further questions as to the proper goals of an
educational system or the proper relationship between state and local boards
of education only multiplied and magnified the "myriad of 'intractable
economic, social, and even philosophical problems'" the Court saw itself
confronting. Because it involved these most delicate and difficult questions
of local taxation, fiscal planning, educational policy, and federalism; con-
siderations counseling a more restrained form of review,75 Rodriguez can
be distinguished from cases which seek equal access to the educational
system for the mentally retarded.
71 Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. at 1300.
721d. at 1301.
73 Id. at 1302.
74 Except Hawaii.
7%Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. at 1300-1302.
19731
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
B. Equal Protection and the Mentally Retarded
For the mentally retarded the issue is whether any children who are
capable of being educated can be denied a public education. Before the
question can be resolved under the equal protection clause it is necessary
to determine the appropriate standard for review. Three possible equal
protection standards currently exist: the strict scrutiny standard, the means-
focused approach, and the rational basis test. Under all of these ap-
proaches, briefly discussed below, the mentally retarded may not be denied
a public education.
Rodriguez having declared that education is not a fundamental interest,
the strict scrutiny test could only be triggered if the mentally retarded
were considered a suspect class. Traditionally, the indicia of suspectness
have included three factors."' First, like race and alienage, mental retar-
dation is an immutable or unalterable trait over which the individual has
no control. Second, because such a trait has become for each individual
a badge of opprobrium or a stigma of inferiority, the class has been subject
to a history of purposeful discrimination, which has made its members
second class citizens. Finally, as a class, the mentally retarded have been
relegated to a position of political powerlessness and thus need special
judicial protection from the majoritarian political process. Because of these
factors-an immutable trait or disability, a history of purposeful discrimina-
tion, and a position of political powerlessness-the mentally retarded quali-
fy as a suspect class. State action excluding such a class from a public
education should, then, fall unless the state can show a compelling interest
in support of the discrimination-a burden the state presumably could
not bear.
If a court did not invoke strict scrutiny, it could apply either the means-
focused test, discussed above, or the rational basis test. These differ in
that the means-focused test requires a careful consideration of the rationality
of the legislation in relation to its purpose, whereas the rational basis test,
under which rationality is presumed, requires a showing that the exclusion
of the mentally retarded serves no legitimate state purpose. Hence, if
the state's legislation or action systematically excluding the mentally re-
tarded from the public school system is unconstitutional under the rational
basis test, it is, a fortiori, unconstitutional under the more exacting means-
focused test.
The rational basis test requires an examination of the state's purpose
and of the state's action in relation to that purpose. The states acknowl-
edge that the purpose of their educational systems, typically stated in state
constitutions, is to educate their citizenry17  Each state implements this
761d. at 1294. See also Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1125-27 (1969).
77 The Legislature shall establish, organize, and maintain a liberal system of public
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constitutional purpose through statutory schemes which establish systems
of public education and make school attendance compulsory. The legiti-
macy of this state purpose is nowhere in dispute. The question to be
resolved, then, is whether state legislation excluding the mentally retarded
is rationally related to the avowed state purpose. The expert data, some
of which is set out in Part II, supra, of this comment, establishes that
most of the children denied a public education by the states because they
are mentally retarded are educable. The state purpose of educating its
citizenry is thereby thwarted by arbitrary state action; here, then is action
which is wholly arbitary and irrational.
Nor may a state effectively argue that its resources are insufficient to
educate the mentally retarded. To make such an argument, the state would
need to establish that not educating the mentally retarded is less expensive
than educating them. In Part II, supra, it was seen that it is economically
more sound for a state to provide the means for the retarded to become
self-supporting than to bear the cost of their care for the rest of their
lives.
Education is one of the costliest services the state provides. But if
we accept the proposition that all children can benefit from education,"
then exclusion of any child is arbitrary indeed. If the goal of the state,
as expressed both in its constitution and in its legislation, is to educate
its citizens, then to exclude citizens who are capable of benefiting from
education is to set off a class of persons in a way that is not reasonably
related to the goals of the state. Equal protection of the law under the
special scrutiny test, the rational basis test or the modified means-focused
test requires at the very least that all children be given access to the state
system of public education.
C. Case Law: Mills and PARC
Since the Supreme Court has yet to consider the right to education
of the mentally retarded, precedent must be found in lower court decisions.
The case law has begun to establish the right to education of mentally
retarded children. In Mills, the class, by the defendant school board's
own estimate, comprised some 15,000 children with various types of handi-
cap, 80 percent of whom were not being served by the public schools. 9
schools throughout the state for the benefit of the children thereof between the ages
of seven and 21 years ... ALA. CONsT. art. XIV, § 256.
The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of the system of free
common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated. OHIO
CONST. art. b, § 2.
The General Assembly shall make such provisions ... as ... will secure a thorough
and efficient system of common schools throughout the state . . . N.Y. CONST § 1.
7 8 PARC, 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972).
79 Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. at 868-69.
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In its opinion, the court decried the school system's complete exclusion
of these children:
The inadequacies of the District of Columbia Public School System wheth-
er occasioned by insufficient funding or administrative inefficiency, cer-
tainly cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on the "exceptional" or
handicapped child than on the normal child.80
The court fashioned a comprehensive scheme of relief, including the due
process safeguards of hearing procedures, notice requirements, and guide-
lines for identification, notification, assessment, and placement of class
members. Furthermore, the court articulated the substantive right of these
children to receive a free public education. It ordered that within thirty
days "the District of Columbia shall provide to each child of school age a
free and suitable publicly-supported education regardless of the degree of
the child's mental, physical or emotional disability or impairment."'" The
Mills decision was not appealed, and is now the established law of the
District of Columbia. What was effectuated by court order in the District
of Columbia was implemented by consent agreement in Pennsylvania.82
Here, too, the court formulated an elaborate scheme to enforce what it
declared to be the clear right of all children to be educated by the state.
Mills and PARC are the landmark cases vindicating the rights of men-
tally retarded children. Significantly, in neither case did defendant depart-
ment of education contest the central issue of its affirmative duty to educate
these children. Nor did either defendant argue that the children could
not benefit from such education.
In addition to the equal protection and due process theories under the
federal constitution, both cases also rest on independent state grounds. In
light of the Rodriguez holding, the state theory of action has become in-
creasingly important, allowing crucial rights to be vindicated without de-
parting from the traditional principle that education is primarily a state
concern. At least thirteen suits are presently being litigated, all of which
rely heavily on state constitutional and statutory rights.83 In addition,
801d. at 876.
811d. at 878.
82 PARC, 343 F. Supp. 279.
8 3 Lori Case v. State of California, Dept. of Educ., Civil Action No. 191679 (Cal. Superior
Ct., Riverside County); Larry P. v. Riles, Civil Action No. C-71-2270 (N.D.Cal.); Kivell
v. Nemoitan, No. 143913 (Superior Ct., Fairfield County, Conn., July 18, 1972); Lebanks
v. Spears, Civil Action No. 71-2897 (E.D. La., N.O. Division); Maryland Association for
Retarded Children v. Maryland, Civil Action No. 72-733-K (U.S. District Ct., Maryland);
Stewart v. Philips, Civil Action No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass.); Harrison v. Michigan, Civil Action
No. 38557 (E.D. Michigan); In the Matter of Peter Held, Civil Action No. H-2-71, (Family
Court of New York, Westchester County); Piontkowski v. Syracuse School District (filed with
Commissioner of Education of State of New York); Hamilton v. Riddle, Civil Action No.
72-86 (Charlotte Division, W.D.N.C.); North Carolina Association for Retarded Children
v. North Carolina Dept. of Educ. (E.D.N.C., Raleigh Division); Panitch v. Wisconsin, Civil
Action No. 72-L-461 (U.S. District Court, Wisconsin).
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plaintiffs also allege denial of equal protection and due process under the
federal constitution. 4 The burgeoning litigation in this field not only pre-
vents exclusion, but also establishes due process procedures for the identi-
fication, classification, and placement of mentally retarded children.
The same theories underlie suits brought to establish a right to treat-
ment of the institutionalized mentally retarded and mentally ill. The fore-
most of these is Wyatt v. Stickney,s" in which a federal district court
granted relief, affirming that mentally retarded persons who are civilly
committed have a constitutional right to treatment which includes the right
to education.
Thus, the principle that there is no justification for denying education
to the mentally retarded is being established both in theory and in litiga-
tion. If, then, education is required, for all children the crucial question
becomes, how is the Brown requirement of "equal educational opportunity"
for all to be reconciled with the Rodriguez minimum requirement of "at
least an adequate program of education" for all?
IV. THE CONTOURS OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms.86
In these words, the Supreme Court recognized a right to "equal educational
opportunity" for all. But the Court did not make clear what a state would
be required to provide in order to meet the equality standard. The Topeka
children of Brown enjoyed schools that were "substantially equal with re-
spect to buildings, transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications
of teachers,"87 yet the Court found them unequal with respect to educational
opportunity. Since 1954, the courts have been struggling with the content
of the term "equal educational opportunity," and so far have provided
at least the negative rule that a state cannot operate racially dual systems
of public schools, no matter how "equal" the facilities or the expenditures.88
How balanced the racial composition must be to provide equality of oppor-
tunity has not yet been established.89 The courts' concern in the inter-
84 It will be remembered that Serrano v. Priest, supra note 56, the important California
school financing case, was decided under both state and federal constitutional theories, and
thus remains viable after Rodriguez because it rests on independent state grounds.
85 344 F. Supp. 387. This case is now on appeal sub. nom. Wyatt v. Aderbolt, and was
argued Dec. 6, 1972, before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
86Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
87 Id. at 486, n.1.
8 8 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. School
Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).8 9 Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221 (1971). Mr.
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vening years, however, has been that a racial minority has received an
inferior educational opportunity and is thus denied the equal protection
of the laws which the fourteenth amendment guarantees.
Equality cannot be measured by expenditures of money for each child.
Equal expenditures were being made in Topeka, Kansas, prior to 1954,
and it was not enough to ensure "equality." And although equal expendi-
tures were not being made in Texas in 1973, the Court found no denial
of equal protection based on this inequity. 0
Neither can equality be measured in terms of achievement; common
sense tells us that children have widely differing potentials for achievement
in school. A state could not require that a child be allowed to remain
in school until he is able, for example, to read or do computations with
a prescribed facility. Some individuals will never be capable of meeting
that standard. Nor would it be desirable from society's point of view
for an educational system to produce a homogeneous set of individuals
who had all met merely a certain minimum standard.
Assuming equality should not be judged solely by the resources poured
into education nor by the resulting "product" of the educational system,
how should it be measured? The word "opportunity" is crucial. The
theory that has found favor with educators is that equal opportunity means
the state should provide means for every cild to develop according to
his own potential, to advance as far as his capabilities will allow. "A
much more realistic and moderate notion of equality would recognize that
there are real and significant differences in talent, ability, and inclination,
and that each person should be treated according to talents and prefer-
ence."91
This theory of education is particularly well suited to a discussion of
the education of the mentally retarded. If equality is measured in terms
of achievement, a state can never offer equal educational opportunity to
those who cannot reach a level of accomplishment which the ordinary
child can reach. If on the other hand, it is measured in terms of develop-
ment of potential, then providing means to enable each child to learn as
much as he is able is appropriate to the widely varying capabilities in
the population. Precisely what a state must provide to ensure this equal
opportunity to its citizens who are less well endowed intellectually than
the "normal" citizen has yet to be determined.
Chief Justic Burger, sitting as Circuit Justice, suggested that there may have been a misreading
of the Swann opinion: "If the Court of Appeals or the District Court read this Court's
opinion as requiring a fixed racial balance or quota, they would appear to have overlooked
specific language of the opinion in the Swan case to the contrary." Id. at 1227.
90 Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278.




Rodriguez requires that at least an adequate minimum must be provided
every child in every school district. But the Court made no attempt to
define what it meant by adequate; and the question of the educational
standard necessary for the mentally retarded population has never been
before the Supreme Court. Lower federal courts have considered the issue,
however, and some have established relatively detailed guidelines which,
might portend the Supreme Court's resolution of the issue.
An Alabama federal district court held in 1972 that institutionalized
mentally retarded citizens have a right to "habilitation." 2 The court de-
fined the term as follows:
... the process by which the staff of the institution assists the resident to
acquire and maintain those life skills which enable him to cope more ef-
fectively with the demands of his own person and of his environment and
to raise the level of his physical, mental, and social efficiency. Habili-
tation includes but is not limited to programs of formal, structured edu-
cation and treatment.93
Thus, in addition to a previously-recognized right of the mentally ill to
treatment, 4 this Alabama court recognized a right to education, which
it defined as "the process of formal training and instruction to facilitate
the intellectual and emotional development of residents." 5 This habilita-
tive ideal is elaborately developed by the court with specific minimum
constitutional standards set forth in the appendix to its April 13, 1972,
opinion.9
Habilitation includes medical treatment, education, and care suited to
the individual's needs, regardless of degree of retardation. An overriding
concern of the court is that the "least restrictive alternative" be applied
to the retardate:
Residents shall have a right to the least restrictive conditions necessary to
achieve the purposes of habilitation. To this end, the institution shall
make every attempt to move residents from (1) more to less structured
living; (2) larger to smaller facilities; (3) larger to smaller living units;(4) group to individual residence; (5) segregated from the community
to integrated into the community living; (6) dependent to independent
living.97
The institution must establish an educational program in light of this
ideal. Specifically, it must meet the following minimum standards: 8
92 Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387.
93 Id. at 395.
94 Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
95 Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. at 395.
9 6Id. at 395-407.
97 d. at 396.
981d. at 397.
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Severe/
Mild 9  Moderate Profound
(1) Class Size ---------------- 12 9 6
(2) Length of school year
(in months) --------------- 9-10 9-10 11-12
(3) Minimum length of school day
(in hours) ---------------- 6 6 6
Whereas the Wyatt court was concerned with providing education to
institutionalized individuals, the courts in Mills and PARC-had the same
concern for the educational needs of the noninstitutionalized retardate.
In their decrees they too established far-reaching guidelines to meet these
needs. However, having established the central right of all children to
education, they focused more on the procedural implementation of this
right. Thus, their concern was for methods of identification, notification,
assessment, placement, and periodic re-evaluation that guaranteed due pro-
cess safeguards. In contrast to Wyatt, both courts leave to the respective
departments of education the precise working out of their court-approved
plans; nevertheless, they unequivocally ordered that educational services
be provided forthwith to these children regardless of their degree of retar-
dation. Further, they again enunciated the idea of the least restrictive al-
ternative by stipulating that homebound instruction was to be the last edu-
cational resort; it was to be considered, short of institutionalization, the
"least preferable of the programs of education and training."'
0 0 In PARC,
the court appointed special masters to oversee the plans, whereas, the court
in Mills ordered that comprehensive plans be submitted to it for approval.
In contrast to the Supreme Court's reluctance in Rodriguez to involve itself
in the educational system's "intractable" problems, the Mills court declared
its intention to supervise closely such matters as curriculum, educational
objectives, teacher qualifications, and compensatory education for children
previously excluded.
The principle of the least restrictive alternative, relied on by these
courts in arriving at minimum standards for the education of mentally
retarded children, bears close resemblance to the "normalization principle"
espoused by some educational theorists. "Normalization" means "making
available to the mentally retarded patterns and conditions of everyday life
which are as close as possible to the norms and patterns of the mainstream
of society."'' When a court orders that children be educated in school
rather than at home, or at home rather than in an institution wherever
possible, it is seeking to "normalize" that child's experience. The logical
application of this normalization principle to the educable mentally re-
99The court contemplated that no mildly retarded individuals would be institutionalized.
However. it has made these temporary provisions for those presently institutionalized.
100 PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 312.
101 CHANG NG PATRNS, supra note 19, at 181.
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tarded is their integration into regular public classrooms. It is the con-
sideration of the legal status of this group to which we now turn.
V. THE RIGHTS OF EMR CHILDREN TO INTEGRATION
INTO THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM
The EMR have an anomalous position in the educational system. Of
all mentally retarded children the EMR are most like "normal" children.
They do not always suffer outright exclusion; however, when they are ad-
mitted into the public schools, it is typically on a segregated basis. The
Supreme Court in Brown' °2 did not in any substantive way state what
constituted equal educational opportunity for blacks; however, it did decide
that whatever such a term meant, it did not mean separate facilities, even
if these were equal in resources. Thus, there was enunciated the idea
that for blacks as a class, separation was inherently unequal. The question
then arises whether the "separate as unequal" doctrine does not have appli-
cation to classifications other than race.
While this statement [separate educational facilities are inherently un-
equal] was made with regard to race, the evidence on which it was made
applies with great force to separate educational facilities on any basis
where one group is regarded as superior and another group is inferior.103
The normal group is certainly regarded as superior to the mentally retarded.
Thus the doctrine may have an equally valid and justifiable application
to the educable mentally retarded. It may be that the proliferating use
of self-contained special classes for EMR children raises some of the same
serious education and civil rights issues as were raised in Brown. The
answer to this question seems to depend on defining this group, pinpointing
the tools used to distinguish EMR children from the "normal" school popu-
lation, and most importantly, analyzing the legitimacy of this process of
definition and classification.
A. Rationale for the Segregation of the Mentally Retarded
Historically, the rationale for segregating the mentally retarded from
those children seen as nonretarded was for the protection of the "normal"
children, an idea aptly expressed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1919.
In this case, a thirteen-year old boy who was "afflicted with a form of
paralysis which affects his whole physical and nervous make-up" (appar-
ently cerebral palsy) brought suit to compel the public schools to readmit
him.' The child, though normal mentally and able to keep pace with
his classmates, was said to produce a "depressing and nauseating effect up-
102 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483.
103 R. HURLEY, POVERTY AND MENTAL RETARDATION: A CAUSAL RBLATIONSHIP 105-
6 (1969).
104 State ex. rel. Beattie v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Antigo, 169 Wis. 231, 232 (1919).
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on the teacher and school children; that by reason of his physical condition
he takes up an undue portion of the teacher's time and attention, distracts
the attention of other pupils, and interferes generally with the discipline
and progress of the school."' 15  The court held that the child's right to
attend school, "like other individual rights, must be subordinated to the
general welfare."'1 6 Though recognizing his right to education under the
state constitution, the court held this right must be denied because his
presence was "harmful to the best interests of the school.' 01 7 The signif-
icant point is not that the standard set by the court is one of harm to
the general welfare, but rather the factor considered to be harmful-the
"depressing and nauseating effect" on others. As the dissenting judge
noted, there was no actual evidence that the boy's presence did have a
"harmful" influence."0 8
Whereas in 1919 the exceptional child was segregated for the "general
welfare," today he is more likely to be segregated "for his own good."'"
9
The theory is that segregation provides a haven in which teaching and
treatment suitable to the retarded child's real needs can be provided by
specially trained teachers who will provide individualized attention. Some
theorists warn that to place such children in regular classes would be to
expose them to continuous, harmful pressure, causing feelings of frustration
and failure.110
It is further argued that there is a pedagogical dilemma inherent in
teaching heterogeneous groups. If the level of the class is adjusted to
the "slow learner," then the other students will become bored, lazy, and
perhaps undereducated. On the other hand, if the level is adjusted to
those of average or above average ability, then the slow learner becomes
isolated, frustrated, and depressed. This reasoning leads to the conclusion
that homogeneous groupings are desirable, if not necessary, in that they
allow level-adapted teaching programs to be set up so that, theoretically,
each child is challenged according to his ability. Such a theory assumes
that there is only one appropriate teaching method: the lecture presenta-
tion geared to one ability level. This assumption should certainly be ques-
tioned in light of evolving educational techniques such as open classrooms,
program learning, and pupil-to-pupil tutoring.
Despite the theoretical benefits of segregation, there is serious question
whether it does actually achieve these practical results. Instead, it may
105 Id.
106 Id. at 234.
107 id.
108 Id. at 236.
109 However, the general welfare rationale still lingers. The idea has become one of
relief, "relieving the normal child from the 'dragging anchor' effect of tl3e retarded child
. " Goldberg, supra note 11, at 5.
119 Gjessing, Integration of the Handicapped: What Demands Will Be Made? 19 THE
SLOW LEARNER 29, 30 (1972).
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have become merely a way for the school system to avoid its responsibilities
to the retarded child."' It allows teachers to use the special class as noth-
ing more than a "dumping place" to discard the "difficult" teaching prob-
lem or the disruptive influence in the classroom." 2 The teacher can thereby
devote himself to what he conceives to be his real task-instructing children
who are able to learn. The irony is that many of the children remaining
could probably learn a great deal on their own, whereas the "misfits" un-
questionably need the teacher's help. Rather than being made part of the
mainstream of the educational process, such children become rather its
flotsam.
To be thus screened out of the mainstream of education is one of
the worst fates a child can suffer because it has an impact far beyond
the school environment. The school is the first social institution with
which the child comes into contact and thus the first that labels him
EMR." 8 Mental retardation may be the most destructive of all stigma
because a person so labelled is thought by many to be completely lacking
in basic competence. One educator has ironically expressed the popular
belief in this way: "As everyone 'knows' mental retardation is irremediable.
There is no cure, no hope, no future. If you are once a mental retardate,
you remain one always."" 4  Such a myth creates the possibility that chil-
dren will be "locked" into a disability category and thus locked into a stig-
matized life style." 5  As the PARC court noted, recent empirical studies-
have shown that "stigmatization is a major concern among parents of re-
tarded children. Some parents liken it to a 'sentence of death.' ,,116
1. Stigma
Of all the attributes of man, mind is the quintessence; to be
found wanting in mental capacity-general intellectual compe-
tence-is the most devastating of all possible stigmata."7
The etymology of the word "stigma" is revealing for the present dis-
cussion. In its archaic sense, a stigma was a mark made on the skin by
burning with a hot iron as a token of infamy or subjugation. It is therefore
not only a mark of inferiority, but is also a permanent brand from which
Ill Tuckman, The Placement of Pseudo-Retarded Children in Classes for Mentally Retarded,
7 ACADEMIC THERAPY 165, 168 (1972).
112 Dunn, Special Education for the Mildly Retarded-Is Much of It Justified? 35 Ex-
CEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5 (1968).
1"3 PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 295.
"14 R. B. EDGERTON, THE CLOAK OF COMPETENCE 207 (1967).
115 Blatt, Public Policy and the Education of Children with Special Needs, 38 ExcEPTIONAL
CHILDREN 537, 541 (1972).
116 PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 295, citing J. MERCER, THE USE AND MISUSE of I.ABELLING
HUMAN BEINGS (1972).
117 R. B. EDGERTON, supra note 114, at vii.
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one never escapes. The word is used pervasively in the literature regarding
the mentally retarded.118  The stigma seems to brand a person entirely
inferior, connoting total incapacity and even blameworthiness.
The error lies in the assumption that a person who lacks the ability to
adapt to the particular demands of the schooling system lacks the ability
to adapt to most other demands made upon him. We do not say of a
person who is incompetent in school: "He is stupid at reading." Rather,
we say, "He is stupid," meaning, "He is (or is destined to be) a fail-
ure."119
If we do not actually believe that intelligence is virtuous, we act as though
we do; conversely, we treat lack of intelligence with contempt. The PARC
court underscored the decisive role the school plays in stigmatizing the
retarded child:
Experts agree that it is primarily the school which imposes the mentally re-
tarded label and concomitant stigmatization upon children, either initially
or later on through a change in educational assignment. This follows
from the fact that the school constitutes the first social institution with
which the child comes into contact.'20
2. Self-fulfilling Prophecy
If you treat an individual as he is, he will stay as he is, but if you
treat him as if he were what he ought to be, he will become what
he ought to be and could be. Goethe.
Once a child is classified as "retarded," the chances are very great that
he will in fact become retarded. 12' This functional academic retardation
is the result of a process often documented in the literature and the case
law as educational self-fulfilling prophecy.-22  When a child is "treated
as if he is uneducable because he has a low test score, he becomes unedu-
cable and the low test score is thereby reinforced.' '123 Because of the low
score, he is placed in a special class with less challenging work and often
less competent teachers. His teachers, expecting less, demand less, and
in response the child produces less. One noted expert, relied on by the
court in Hobson v. Hansen, describes this teacher-pupil relationship-an
interaction he terms "teacher expectation":
118 Han, "Special Miseducation"--The Politics of Special Education, 3&4 INEQUALITY IN
EDUCATION 17 (1972); Blatt, supra note 115; Tuckman, supra note 111; Goldberg, supra note
11.
119 A. DEXTER, supra note 91, at 2.
120 PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 295.
121Han, supra note 118.
1'2 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 484 (D.D.C. 1967). See Rosenthal & Jacobsen,
Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in the Classroom: Teachers' Expectations as Unintended Determinants
of Pupils' Intellectual Competence in M. DEUTCH, SOCIAL CLASS, RACE, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENT (1967).
123 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. at 484.
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The horrible consequence of a teacher's low expectation is that it tends
to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The unfortunate students, treated as if
they were subnormal, come to accept as a fact that they are subnormal.
They act out in their school behavior and in the testing situation what they
have been conditioned to believe is their true status in life; and in con-
forming to expectations, they "confirm" the original judgment. 24
Re-evaluation of this child will merely serve to reflect what was once only
the teacher's expectation and has now become the child's expectation as
well.
Central to the process is the fact that, in contrast to regular classes,
special education courses are nonsequential. This means these classes tend
to receive a cyclic treatment of the same material, whereas the regular
classes are taught with a sequential progression of ever-more sophisticated
material. The result of this substantive difference in teaching is that a
child placed in a special class is locked there, because on re-testing he
will continually be compared with children of his chronological age who
by the very operation of the system are necessarily more advanced than
he is. Every year he falls further behind.125  Kenneth Clark expresses
the irony of this "Catch-22" situation: If a child scores low on an intelli-
gence test because he cannot read and then is not taught to read because
he has a low test score, then such a child is being imprisoned in an iron
circle and becomes the victim of an educational self-fulfilling prophecy. 2
The most important facet of the self-fulfilling prophecy is the peer
group interaction in the special class environment. Of all the factors which
"contribute to a child's achievement in school-facilities, curriculum, teacher
competence, background of fellow students-one prominent commentator
found that intelligence and verbal ability of one's classmates is the single
most important factor which affects school achievement and academic prog-
ress.1 7  A child is challenged in large measure by his peers. They deter-
mine the intellectual environment created in the classroom. Despite the
importance of protecting a child from excessive frustration, his "happiness,"
or the contentment which he may feel when surrounded by retarded chil-
dren only, is not the decisive consideration. More important, he needs to
be "stimulated and challenged toward integration in school and society
even if this is initially unpleasant for him.' 2 8
An atmosphere of low expectation is established by a confluence of
1241.
12 5 Tuckman, supra note 111, at 167. The situation exemplifies Xenon's paradox: Presented
with half the material of a regular dass each year, even a child who is at the top of his
special class can never close the gap.
126 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. at 484, citing Clark, Educational Stimulation of
Racially Disadvantaged Children in EDUCATION IN DEPRESSED AREAS 142, 150 (A. H. Pas-
sow ed., 1963).
12 7 J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1969).
128 Gjessing, supra note 110, at 31.
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all these factors. A child who is viewed by his teachers and peers as
retarded, i.e., incapable of "normal" learning, "soon becomes socialized to
play the role successfully and to meet the lesser demands of his retarded
status."'' 9 He has begun the inevitable "regression toward the mean"-
the often seen phenomenon that a person's functioning and behavior tend
to approximate those of the group to which [he3 belongs."'' 0
3. Misabelling and Misdiagnosis
The stigma of bearing the label 'retarded' is bad enough, but
to bear the label when placement is questionable or outright
erroneous is an intolerable situation.131
The I.Q. score is used to identify the EMR and to justify segregating
the EMR from those who have higher scores. Those children who are
generally referred to as "educable mentally retarded" usually have an I.Q.
range beginning at 50-55 and ending around 75-79.132 The determination
of any individual child's I.Q. is derived from a psychological test adminis-
tered by a state approved, certified, or licensed psychologist. In addition,
some states require certain other supporting data such as physical examina-
tions, social work case studies, and school counselor and teacher reports.
But for the most part, placement of a child in an EMR class rests on
the results of a single, school-administered I.Q. test.
Perhaps the most well-known and widely-used test is the Stanford-
Binet; a brief consideration of its origins and purpose will illustrate the
danger of using it to determine a child's classification within the school
system. First developed in the early 1900's by Alfred Binet and Theodore
Simon, the test was not conceived as a measurement of intelligence per
se. Rather, the two men had been commissioned by the Ministry of Public
Instruction in France to devise a method for distinguishing those children
who could not benefit from the instruction in the schools from those who
could. It was essentially a selection device for the schools, having no
real relationship to any theory of intelligence. Although the Binet test
has been revised and standardized, it still serves merely to measure a child's
present academic achievement rather than his potential for growth.
Despite the obvious limitations of such instruments, I.Q. tests have not
been used in a correspondingly limited way. In many school systems,
they have a broad and far-reaching impact on the type of schooling a
child receives. They determine in which class he will be placed, who
129 Bauer & Yamamoto, Designing Instructional Settings for Children Labelled Retarded:
Some R~eflections, ELEMENTARY SCHOOL J. (1972).
130 Tuckman, supra note 111, at 166.
181 Garrison & Hammill, Wfho -Are the Retarded?, 38 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 13, 20
(1971).
182 Goldberg, supra note 11.
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will teach him, and what and how he will be taught.133  Inadequate treat-
ment of the mentally retarded results from the misuse of the I.Q. test
by the school system, which views it as a definition of intelligence.
A noted psychologist stresses that it is a misconception to believe that
aptitude or intelligence tests measure something called "native ability"-
"something fixed and immutable within the person that determines his
level of expectation for all time."'1 4  Conceding that an entity such as
innate ability may exist, this psychologist maintains that "intelligence or
aptitude tests do not measure such an entity-at least not directly; and
certainly not in any interpretable manner."'"3 5 What I.Q. tests do measure
is the experience with and exposure to a particular cultural body of knowl-
edge, specifically, the verbal and cognitive skills peculiar to white, middle
class society.' 38 Thus, they indicate what one has learned rather than what
one could learn.
Therefore, when the school system uses the I.Q. measurement as a basis
for classifying and placing children, it is using a blunt instrument as though
it were a finely-honed scalpel. The resulting possibilities for error are
staggering. Recent research indicates that there are a variety of factors
other than actual retardation that can cause poor performance on I.Q. tests,
including unfamiliarity with the language of the test, racial and socio-
economic factors, insufficient pre-academic experience, emotional-social in-
adequacy or disturbance, minimal impairments of speech, hearing, concep-
tualization, perception, or other fundamental processes. 37  More glaringly,
a 1969 study revealed that children were more frequently placed in special
classes because of "negative attitudinal characteristics" than because of "fac-
tual evidence of intellectual deficits.' 13 8  Special classes are not the place
for children with such problems.
No one in special education views the educable class placement as ap-
propriate for underachieving, dull, educationally lagging, emotionally dis-
turbed, or intellectually normal or near normal children. Yet the findings
of this study suggest the presence of a large percentage of these children
in today's educable classes.' 39
The study referred to above was that relied on by the court in PARC.
The researchers found that of 378 EMR students from 36 individual school
districts in the five-county greater Philadelphia area, 25 percent were errone-
33 Han, supra note 118.
134 Dyer, Is Testing a Menace to Education?, 49 N.Y. STATE EDUCATION 16 (1961).
135Id.
136 Ross, Young, & Cohen, Confrontation: Special Education Placement and the Law, 38
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5 (1971).
137 Garrison & Hammill, supra note 131, at 13.
'
3 8 Tuckman, supra note 111, at 168. Many times extremely bright but emotionally disturbed
children score low enough on I.Q. tests to be classified as "educable" or "trainable."
139 Garrison & Hammill, supra note 131, at 19-20.
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ously diagnosed as EMR. The diagnoses of another 43 percent were ques-
tionable. Thus, as many as 68 percent of those then in EMR classes
in Philadelphia may have been misplaced. The researchers indicated that
the findings should be valid for all major metropolitan areas.14' This
is supported by a study done in Boston by the Harvard Center for Law
and Education' 4 ' which determined that based on the 3 percent incidence
of mental retardation in the general population, approximately 1500 Bos-
ton children ought to qualify for special classes. However, there are cur-
rently 2700 children that have been so placed and another 1100 who
have been placed on a waiting list for these classes.' 42  This means that
the school system has already classified for special placement more than
double the number which should properly be so classified.
Considering the enormous possibilities for error in labelling and diag-
nosis and the destructive effect of the stigma and resulting self-fulfilling
prophecy, it is no wonder that one observer has termed the I.Q. test the
"lethal label."' 4  Another expert wrote in similar terms of the deadly
impact of the I.Q. label:
By the end of the century the psychologists had evolved a new and secu-
lar version of infant damnation. It was the low I.Q. If they could be
tagged with this it was the same as if the Good Lord had clone it....
Hence, the society was not responsible for their plight. Providence had
intervened in their lives. 144
B. Legal Theories for the Integration of the EMR
The furor that has raged at various times over the use of I.Q. tests
has recently become more than an educational dispute. It has increasingly
become a legal problem because of the effect these tests can have on the
rights of children in the educational system. Parents and others concerned
with the civil rights of the mentally retarded are turning to the courts
to vindicate the right to equal educational opportunity for these children.
There can be no question but that today the ability-group placement
of children based primarily on I.Q. tests works to the disadvantage of cul-
tural minorities and low socio-economic classes. The first case to consider
the legal effects of this kind of ability grouping was Hobson v. Hansen,'145
in which the court struck down the "tracking" system of the District of
Columbia public schools. The tracking system classified and placed stu-
dents according to "ability," ranging from "basic" (EMR) to "honors."
Although the system was designed to allow inter-track mobility, Judge
140 Id. at 18.
141Han, supra note 118.
142Id. at 18.
'43Mercer, LQ.: The Lethal Label, 1972 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 44.
144 Tuckman, supra note 111, at 168.
145269 F. Supp. 401.
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Skelly Wright found that in practice it was inflexible, with more than
90 percent of the children locked into the track in which they were origi-
nally placed. He found that the "four-track system [hadj degenerated
into a four-rut system."' 46 The most important single aspect of the track
system, says Judge Wright, is the process by which the school system sorts
students into the various tracks. The keystone, the fundamental premise
of the entire system, is: "[ThatJ school personnel can with reasonable ac-
curacy ascertain the maximum potential of each sudent and fix the content
and pace of his education accordingly. If this premise proves false, the
theory of the track system collapses.' ' 4  Relying on expert testimony, the
court found that the standardized aptitude tests used in this sorting process
created a "substantial risk of being wrongly labelled.' 148  Consequently,
the court found that such tests are
completely inappropriate for use with a large segment of the student body.
Because these tests are primarily standardized on and are relevant to a
white middle class group of students, they produce inaccurate and mis-
leading test scores when given to lower class and Negro students. As a
result, rather than being classified according to ability to learn, these stu-
dents are in reality being classified according to their socio-economic or
racial status, or-more precisely-according to environmental and psycho-
logical factors which have nothing to do with innate ability.149
The court concluded that the significant feature of the District of Colum-
bia's track system was the sorting of students into rigid, inflexible tracks,
causing both physical segregation and disparity of educational opportunity.
Most importantly, it meant that the lower track student, rather than getting
an "enriched educational experience," suffered what was essentially a "lim-
ited or watered-down curriculum."'8 0
Hobson presaged a host of litigation brought recently to enjoin perma-
nently the use of I.Q. tests as a basis for EMR placement. Most of these
suits were specifically concerned with the effect these tests have on cultural
minorities.
In Diana v. State Board of Education,'151 Mexican-American plaintiffs
alleged that they had been improperly placed in EMR classes, and noted
that although Mexican-American children made up 13 percent of the school
population, they comprised almost 30 percent of the students in the pro-
gram for the mentally retarded. The plaintiffs alleged that the I.Q. tests
had an inherent cultural bias which discriminated against Mexican-Amer-
ican persons, based as they were on English verbal skills and standardized
146d. at 464.
147 1 Id. at 474.
148 Id. at 489.
149 Id. at 514.
15°0M. at 513.
151 Diana v. State Bd. of Educ., C-7037 RFP, District for Northern California (Feb., 1970).
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on a sample population made up entirely of white, native-born Ameri-
cans.'52 In a stipulated settlement, defendant school board agreed to test
all children in their primary language in the future, to re-test those currently
placed in EMR classes, and to submit a written report explaining any dis-
parity between the percentages of Mexican-American students in regular
classes and in EMR classes. 58
Black citizens in Claifornia brought a similar suit seeking even more
far-reaching relief based on the invalidity of the I.Q. tests. Plaintiffs in
Larry P. v. Riles154 asked for an injunction restraining defendants from
further placement of black children into mentally retarded classes on the
basis of present I.Q. tests, and immediate return to regular classes of chil-
dren presently in EMR classes unless they can be re-tested and re-evaluated
by means of a nondiscriminatory test. In demanding the hiring of black
psychologists and psychometrists, the plaintiffs were attacking not only the
test per se, but the test as administered, noting that the results are invalid
because of the cultural disparities in test, testor, and testee. The parties
are presently involved in discovery, but in June 1972 the court granted
a preliminary injunction against California's use of I.Q. tests for placing
black children in EMR classes.155
A Boston case has extended the legal theories of Diana and Riles by
including in its class of plaintiffs not just racially but also socio-economically
disadvantaged children. In so doing, the plaintiffs in Stewart v. Philips
56
have accepted the analysis made by Judge Wright in Hobson, 57 recognizing
the influence not only of black culture but also of poverty in determining
test performance. 58 Again, the suit is based on the invalidity of the I.Q.
test as a tool for placement, but the named plaintiffs, who had already
been placed in EMR classes, were subsequently tested by independent psy-
chologists and found not to be retarded. In addition to damages, the plain-
tiffs seek the establishment of a state Commission of Individual and Edu-
cational Needs to devise new tests and programs. 5
152 In an earlier case, Spangler v. Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal. 1970),
a defendant board of education had admitted that the intelligence tests used were inaccurate,
unfair, and racially discriminatory.
15 Diana v. State Bd. of Educ., C-7037 RFP, District for Northern California (Feb., 1970).
154 Larry P. v. Riles, Civil Action No. C-71-2270 (N.D. Cal.). See also Lebanks v. Spears,
Civil Action No. 71-2897 (E.D. La., New Orleans Division), a similar suit in which the black
plaintiffs also asked for money damages. In an interesting development, the defendant State
Department of Education filed a third party complaint against the United States Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare and the United States Commissioner of Education alleging
that the primary duty to educate all children according to their needs rests on the federal govern-
ment. HEW, MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE LAW 24 (1973).
155 HEW, MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE LAw 24 (1973).
156 Stewart v. Philips, Civil Action No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass. 1970).
157 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. at 451-492, Findings of Fact IV-D & F. See also
R. HURLEY, supra note 103.
158 Ross, Young, & Cohen, supra note 136, at 9.
159HEW, supra note 155, at 18.
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This line of cases attacks the use of I.Q. tests for EMR placement as
a denial of due process and equal protection. Due process is denied when
persons are summarily classified and stigmatized by the state without provi-
sion for notice, hearing, and educationally valid evaluation procedures.
Further, equal protection is denied when persons so classified receive op-
portunities definitely inferior to those provided other students. The equal
protection problems are compounded by the fact that the procedural irregu-
larities especially disadvantage certain racial and socio-economic groups.
Such constitutional violations are most egregious for those erroneously clas-
sified.
At a minimum, procedural safeguards must be provided to ensure prop-
er classification of the moderately, severely, and profoundly retarded. But
for the EMR class, comprising the vast majority of the mentally retarded,
such classification procedures alone may not be sufficient to guarantee equal
educational opportunity. EMR children apparently learn most efficiently
when they are challenged by progressively more difficult material and by
their peers in the classroom. Modern experts in "special education" have
been arguing for several years that EMR children not only learn better
with, but do not impede the progress of, normal children when placed
in regular classrooms. 160 If this is so, then the segregation of the EMR
into special classes when they could learn better in regular classes is a
denial of equal educational opportunity if such is measured in terms of
capability for learning. The "separate as unequal" doctrine seems to apply
as readily to the EMR classification as it does to race. Furthermore, any
sharp line between "retarded" and "normal" is a necessarily arbitrary divi-
sion on a continuum, and the possibility for misjudgment is considerable.
Because of the inadequacy and inaccuracy of devices used for measuring
the capacity for learning, outright error occurs frequently and weighs espe-
cially heavily on cultural minorities. Finally, the stigma and the self-
fulfilling prophecy which result from placement in separate classes labeled
"retarded" are destructive to all children, even those who are truly "slow
learners."
Equal protection of the law requires that all children be provided an
education by the state. It should be considered a matter of right, and
not a gift generously bestowed by the state. Furthermore, the EMR class
of children have a viable equal protection claim for integration into the




160 Dunn, supra note 112.
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